

REVISED STANDARD JOINT PROGRAMME DOCUMENT



United Nations Support Mission in Libya
بعثة الأمم المتحدة للدعم في ليبيا



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Cover page

Country: **Libya**



Programme title: **UNSMIL/UNDP Policing and Security Joint Programme**

Joint programme outcome: **National capacities to advance safety and security in Tripoli are improved, including through more effective and public-oriented policing and rule of law services.**

Programme duration:	24 months	Total estimated budget*:	USD 6,840,642
Anticipated start/end dates:	1 October 2017 – 30 September 2019	Out of which:	
Managing agent:	UNDP Libya	1. Funded Budget:	USD 2,950,000
Strategic partner:	UNSMIL	2. Unfunded budget:	USD 3,890,642
		* Total estimated budget includes both programme costs and indirect support costs	

Sources of funded budget:	
• Government	Nil
• UNDP/BPPS	USD 1,000,000
• United States (INL)	USD 1,950,000

Names, signatures and seals of national authority and implementing UN entity

Executing UN entity	National coordinating authority
<p>Ms. Noura Hamladji UNDP Libya Country Director</p>  <p>United Nations Development Programme 21 September 2017</p>	<p>H.E. Mr. Al-Aref al-Khoga Minister of the Interior</p>  <p>Government of Libya 21 September 2017</p>




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1. Executive summary

In recognition of recent political and security developments in Libya and related opportunities to enhance stability in Tripoli and avert the further erosion of institutional capacities, and against the backdrop of the UN Secretary-General's decision to move ahead with relocating the United Nations into Libya, the Government of National Accord (GNA) has requested assistance from UNSMIL and UNDP to efforts of the Ministry of Interior, Libyan police and criminal justice institutions to advance security and the rule of law in Libya's capital. Based on detailed assessments of the current context and capabilities, and in consultation with Libyan stakeholders, priority areas have been identified for programmatic engagement as follows:

- 1. Structure, roles and resourcing of local police and criminal justice institutions clarified and prioritised according to identified needs in Tripoli.*
- 2. Effectiveness of law enforcement and prison service delivery in Tripoli improved through provision of training and technical and material assistance.*
- 3. Ministry of Interior enabled to better assess and provide feasible reintegration and demobilisation options for members of armed formations.*
- 4. Ministry of Interior provided with capacity development and organisational assistance.*

In line with UN commitment to integrated assistance, and with support from the *Global Focal Point arrangement for Police, Justice and Corrections*, UNSMIL and UNDP are rolling out a 'Policing & Security Joint Programme', which will maximise the capabilities of the UN system in support of the GNA's agenda in these critical areas. This joint programme is fully aligned with UNSMIL's Security Council mandate as outlined in resolution 2376 (2017) and leverages UNDP's operational deployment and footprint inside all Libya as a programmatic entity of the UN Country Team. The programme relies on the police, justice, and corrections expertise within the UN Mission and draws on UNDP's experience in governance and capacity building of police and rule of law institutions in complex transitional settings. The European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) will be a critical partner for technical and strategic cooperation in the course of programme implementation. The programme is intended to provide a coherent framework of assistance to the GNA's efforts to strengthen security and rule of law in Tripoli, as a first step that can be emulated elsewhere in Libya. In seeking to achieve these ends, the implementing UN entities will work in direct partnership with key government entities of the security and justice sector as well as Libyan civil society, and in close coordination with other multilateral and bilateral actors, including donors/development partners.

2. Situation analysis

Six years since the toppling of the former regime in October 2011, political disagreements over sovereignty and governance, economic uncertainty, and a deeply volatile security situation continue to hamper Libya's transition to sustainable peace. The Presidency Council (PC) and Government of National Accord (GNA) face a daunting series of problems in effectively extending State authority over all Libyan territory, ensuring security, delivering services, and restoring economic growth, while also building public trust and resolving an ongoing political and security crisis. Proliferation of weapons has left justice and security institutions unable to address ordinary crime and lawlessness, such as kidnapping and robberies, or serious human rights violations such as abductions, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detention, torture, and extrajudicial killings.

De facto martial law, imposed in the west by non-state armed formations and in the east by parts of the Libya National Army, allows for some justice and policing activities to continue functioning, however, the state is limited in its ability to enforce jurisdiction over armed actors. Detention centres have little oversight and detainees continue face deplorable conditions and limited access to due process or fair trial. Justice sector actors, including investigative branches of the police, continue to face attacks, intimidation and threats. While present throughout the country, police have limited capability to implement their law enforcement and security functions. With the widespread availability of arms and increasingly powerful criminal networks, and with many policing functions and resources

outsourced to armed formations, the ability of the police to provide security has also been undermined and has increased the risk of the police becoming a permanent hybrid of state and non-state actors.

Recognising that the political process is intimately tied to progress on security, the Libyan Political Agreement (2015) outlined clear security priorities for the Government of National Accord, including a commitment “to support and develop such [security] institutions” and to put in place interim security arrangements to take forward a “plan for security of the cities, starting with the capital, in coordination with the relevant security institutions.” UNSMIL has been supporting the GNA to take forward these commitments under the LPA, most recently with development of the Tripoli Security Plan.

According to the 2016/2017 assessment of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and police undertaken by UNDP, the current administrative structure of the MOI and the police is not fit for purpose: excessive reorganisation by decree, lack of centralised human resources management, and lax procurement and financial management are minimising the ability of the MOI to support the police. Additionally, the MOI faces challenges related to strategic planning and executive decision-making. These challenges can be seen also in the efforts by the MOI to integrate and monitor new police entrants since 2011, and in the reconfiguration of existing police services to adapt to the threats posed by weapons proliferation amongst organised criminal and political networks. The 2016/2017 rule of law assessment undertaken by UNDP similarly highlights how “[t]he 2011 revolution shifted the country from a highly militarised state to a highly armed society, creating challenges for maintenance of order and serious security issues for justice sector actors. Decisions taken after the 2011 revolution, which sought to bring revolutionary (*thumar*) groups under state control by providing salaries and incorporating them into state security institutions, did not achieve the intended effect, instead empowering new parallel structures within and outside the formal justice and security framework.” The assessment further indicated that while courts function in Western Libya, that lack of security and the multiple security actors severely affects the rule of law, particularly as actors may fail to adhere to criminal procedure codes or laws of evidence, putting pressure on prosecutors and judges.

Libya’s political and government systems have been effectively frozen since 2014, as political disagreements over sovereignty and governance deteriorated into armed conflict among geographical, political, and military factions. Mass proliferation of weapons has paralysed the state’s ability to secure its transitional authorities from violence, provide baseline levels of security essential for extending state authority over Libyan territory, and uphold the rule of law. Despite ongoing efforts to secure commitment to the Libya Political Agreement and Government of National Accord, conflict continues between the country’s major power blocs, and state structures and armed forces are affected by rival claims to sovereignty: The House of Representatives and Libyan National Army in the east, and the Government of National Accord in the west.

Notwithstanding the substantial challenges of the Libyan context, there is growing consensus on the need for technical assistance to support the reactivation of essential government services, particularly in the areas of security and rule of law. Recent political developments may also provide more favourable conditions for programmatic engagement with relevant security and justice actors. The potential for improved relations between eastern actors and the international community, including through talks between the factions during the summer of 2017, as well as ongoing technical engagements in the police and security sector, have also improved potential to scale up later to a regional or national level.

Opportunities are also presented by improvements in the security situation in Tripoli, and the UN’s restatement of its commitment to return operations to Libya. There is a notable improvement in the control of the security situation in the capital by forces loyal to the GNA, which has enabled state security actors to progress in planning for securing Tripoli, increasing visibility and improving service delivery. Over the last six months, pro-GNA armed formations have exerted pressure on the hard-line opposition armed groups and prevented them from destabilising Tripoli. This has allowed state security actors to re-emerge, with initial deployments of the Presidential Guard, and of police units, across Tripoli under the framework of the Tripoli Security Plan.

3. Strategies, including lessons learned & the proposed joint programme

Background/context: Within this highly volatile environment, the overall goal of the UNSMIL/UNDP Joint Programme is to provide targeted assistance to improve national capacities to advance safety and security in Tripoli, including through more effective and public-oriented policing and rule of law services. This objective is designed to contribute, through the UN Integrated Strategic Framework in Libya, to the achievement of both Libyan national priorities and international commitments to the restoration of peace, security and the rule of law in Libya.

Specifically, the Joint Programme aims to support Libyan authorities' work towards better planning and execution of security arrangements in Tripoli. Policing and criminal justice services are critical to these efforts, and work to enhance police deployments and operations for securing the capital must be undertaken in parallel with longer-term institutional support. The joint programme therefore emphasises a holistic approach that seeks to advance delivery of effective and accountable justice and law enforcement services, including through improved facilities and training, whilst also reinforcing the executive, planning, and administrative government functions that should sustain them, ensuring that benefits remain over the long-term and that a basis is put in place for further institutional development and professionalisation. Such a holistic approach must also be cognisant of the interconnected nature of security and rule of law development, ensuring that improved police services are matched by increased absorptive capacity of the criminal justice chain more broadly. Meanwhile, in view of the fragile social fabric of the Libyan context, there is a critical need for public engagement with and 'acceptance' of measures intended to strengthen security and the rule of law. All efforts have been made to build these considerations into the design of this joint programme.

The joint programme has been designed to respond to national priorities and needs as articulated by Libyan counterparts. In particular, it aims to align to the stated needs and aspirations of Libyan police, MOI and MOJ officials themselves, who have requested such support. It also draws on the experience of UNSMIL and UNDP in working within the unique culture and country context of Libya, including the implications of weak and disempowered public service system (including the police) as a legacy of the former regime.

Lessons learned: The focus, content and strategy of the UNSMIL/UNDP Policing and Security Joint Programme as elaborated in this joint programme document is the product of considerable analysis and reflection on the successes and challenges of past and present international assistance in Libya, and has been informed extensively by discussions with Libyan counterparts and stakeholders.

Lessons may be drawn from a number of security sector reform efforts pre- and post-2011 to inform this programme.¹ Firstly, programmatic engagement in the area of SSR is more sustainable when accompanied by government policy and regulatory reform. Reforms introduced in 2006 enabled government ownership and buy-in to training assistance, and enabled greater monitoring and evaluation oversight of said assistance. The Tripoli Security Plan and Libya Political Agreement provide the government the legal basis to make necessary institutional arrangements and appointments in the security sector and is the policy basis upon which this programme is developed. It also enables necessary regulatory reforms, which must be enacted at the level of the minister, to take place.

A second lesson is the importance of linking training assistance to strong M&E evaluation, and strategic assistance in the areas of vetting, selection procedures, code of conduct SOPs, and human resource management of security and justice actors. Some bilateral training engagements from 2011-14 in the security sector – notably those where training was offered overseas – experienced substantive disciplinary issues, late or mismanaged payment, and highly limited oversight for recipients re-

¹ Previous security sector reform (SSR) and training programmes in Libya include various bilateral training and non-lethal equipment provision programmes with the police and judicial police from 2004-11, limited UN and bilateral offers of foreign training to police and defence forces from 2011-14. Prior to 2011, programmes were backed by government policy and legal/regulatory reforms; post-2011, only one government SSR policy, the 'General Purpose Force', led to limited bilateral training engagements, and the policy was ultimately abandoned with the end of the Ali Zaidan administration in 2014.

entering the security force. The importance of connecting short-term training assistance to long-term capacity building, monitoring and oversight of security sector administration should be recognised.

In this light, it is notable that in Libya, policing and security sector functions are frequently (though not always) outsourced via direct contracting appointments from police directorates to security entities established after 2011. These entities are not integrated to state policing forces except via the aforementioned direct contracts, and security actors often only have a six-week 'basic intensive training'.

Recognising the limited capacity of many of the actors that are delivering policing services, including on human rights, the programme framework includes significant investment in and monitoring of the quality of training offered through the programme, including review of the target audiences in line with the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy.² It also focuses on capacity building assistance aimed at supporting the Libyan government to meet its obligations with international standards for human rights.³

The proposed joint programme: This joint programme aims to maximise the capabilities of the UN system in Libya. It combines the technical and political resources of the integrated Special Political Mission (SPM), the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), with UNDP, which as an implementing agency possesses both operational deployment capacity and experience in governance and capacity development of police and rule of law institutions in complex transitional settings.

UNSMIL is mandated to provide assistance in support of Libya's transition from conflict to stability and development, including as concerns the advancement of good governance anchored in security and the rule of law.⁴ UNSMIL Security Institutions Division has been supporting the GNA to take forward commitments made under the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement, including a commitment "to support and develop such [security] institutions" and to put in place interim security arrangements to take forward a "plan for security of the cities, starting with the capital, in coordination with the relevant security institutions."

UNDP has been present in Libya since 1976, and since the 2011 revolution has adapted considerably to support stabilisation and resilience, transitional governance, civic engagement and national dialogue, with ongoing operational deployments across eastern, western and southern Libya. A joint programmatic approach is intended to provide a coherent framework of assistance by the United Nations to the GNA's efforts to strengthen security and rule of law in Tripoli, as a first step that can be emulated elsewhere in Libya.

The entry points for assistance targeted by the Joint Programme are derived from extensive analysis and experience of the Libyan security and justice sectors, both substantively and operationally. Planned interventions have been carefully sequenced for the two years' implementation period, and provision has been made in the programme resources to ensure the most suitable expertise, implementing partnerships, and operational support are put in place to deliver on this ambitious programme whilst simultaneously ensuring value for money for donors/development partners.

² The HRDDP is a 2013 Policy Committee Decision of the Secretary General that limits UN support to non-UN security actors in situations where there is a "substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk of the receiving entities committing grave violations of international humanitarian, human rights or refugee law and where the relevant authorities fail to take the necessary corrective or mitigating measures." In addition to the HRDDP, the programme will also ensure alignment with the vetting requirements of the US Foreign Assistance Act of 1916 Section 620M (the 'Leahy' amendment).

³ Libya is party to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1989), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1970), Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1989), International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1968), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1970), International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (2004), Convention on the Rights of the Child (1993).

⁴ As per Security Council Resolution S/2017/775 on 13 September 2017, UNSMIL's mandate has been renewed until 15 September 2018, including to support the "consolidation of the governance, security and economic arrangements of the Government of National Accord" and to "support to key Libyan institutions".

Sustainability of results: The UNSMIL/UNDP joint programme recognises that sustainability is a particular challenge in the current Libyan context, which is marked by ongoing conflict and instability, and the limited reach of state institutions. Yet there are several ways in which this joint programme aims to enhance the sustainability of results, by focussing on developing the capacities of individuals, systems and institutions (and how these interact) in a manner that empowers targeted counterparts with increased professional skills, legal and regulatory frameworks and strategies, improved and standardised work processes, and a service oriented approach – and, importantly, by doing so in a manner commensurate with national ownership and investment (state and non-state) in the process. Among the specific sustainability strategies internalised and promoted by the joint programme are the following:

- i. **Sequence, monitor and evaluate programme activities carefully:** Success requires that necessary police reforms, human resource management (including vetting) and executive capacity assistance precede and underpin support to frontline policing and prison services. Programming will, using the 'holistic' rationale outlined above, focus activities and resources judiciously to avoid 'putting the cart before the horse.' Activities in Outputs 1 and 4 emphasise early focus on strengthening project focal points and project management capacity within the MOI, coordinating strategic planning (including training and vetting planning), process management and any necessary changes to the policy or regulatory framework. Outputs 2 and 3 emphasise targeted, measurable assistance, scaled appropriately, and focused on tangible and visible improvements at the level of target communities. A robust and ongoing monitoring and evaluation network will also be necessary to monitor activity outcomes reinforce work done elsewhere in the project.
- ii. **Beginning in the capital, keep outputs realistically-sized, with a view to scaling up in the future:** The joint programme will support broader efforts led by the Libyan authorities to secure Tripoli in the immediate timeframe by granting targeted assistance to policing services, to prevent further weakening of institutional capacities, and to nurture central capabilities to sustain gains in security and the rule of law. An improved security context in Tripoli, including through efforts to initiate reintegration of armed formations into host communities, can enhance confidence in the government, provide an enabling environment for a secure transition towards elections, the re-engagement of the international community in Libya, and also address broader social and economic development issues to the Libyan people. Thus, the joint programme will focus initially on Tripoli, where the main central administrative structures are located, and where the GNA is in the early stages of implementing the Tripoli Security Plan. Successful engagement with the central administration and police services increase the likelihood of 'scaling up' to pilot areas regionally or nationally, building on the outcomes of previous programme cycles. Where possible, justice and police actors from all parts of the country would be invited to participate in programme activities to encourage a common approach on technical matters and on administrative processes.
- iii. **Accommodate the way of working, culture and processes of the Libyan context, securing buy-in at the technical as well as the executive level:** Libyan ownership of the joint programme is a critical aspect of its overall strategy, and ensuring that Libyans are able to adopt and integrate programme outputs is essential for reforms to gather momentum and become sustainable. Particularly given the transitional nature of the government, reforms aimed at creating new organisational constructs may struggle to take hold. Recognising that Libyan stakeholders are already making active efforts - albeit with resource constraints - to address issues identified by UN and international needs assessments, programming should begin by engaging sensitively with and building buy-in for efforts already being made. Based on extensive consultations with Libyan counterparts, the programme has been designed in response to the priorities outlined by Libyans actors, and the programme will continue to be implemented in a manner consistent with the requests and priority needs of the minister and government, working to address gaps, build capacities, and advance best practices in a manner consistent with Libyan norms.

4. Results framework and theory of change

The UNSMIL/UNDP Joint Programme is structured around four mutually reinforcing outputs:

Output 1: Structure, roles and resourcing of local police and prison management institutions clarified and prioritised according to identified needs in Tripoli

Output 1 focuses on laying the necessary groundwork for direct assistance to police and prison services. Beginning by working with MOI and MOJ focal points and project teams to clarify and codify organisational and command structures, training curriculae, and all necessary standard operating procedures, it will work with those stakeholders to conduct all necessary preliminary assessments; crime and victimisation surveying to assess police service needs, full needs assessments for training, equipment and systems, prison facility and security assessments, and assessment of prison governance structures and implementation of legal codes. From this assessment, the formulation of a full project work plan, agreed and under national ownership by the MOI and MOJ, will be a key part of the activities of Output 1. Similarly, coordination mechanisms between police and judicial police will be reviewed under this output, with a view to strengthening coordination between law enforcement and criminal justice actors for Output 2.

Output 2: Effectiveness of law enforcement and criminal justice institutions service delivery in Tripoli improved through provision of training and technical and material assistance

Output 2 focuses on direct assistance to policing and criminal justice service providers to advance security in Tripoli. Output 2 will begin with establishing robust vetting/training selection procedures for police and prison officers in line with international human rights standards. Through this mechanism the programme will support the GNA's roll-out of the Tripoli Security Plan (TSP) through activation and scale-up of police operations in Tripoli, including through implementing an improved community policing model that develops Libyan policing practices towards international best practice, training of vetted police and prison officers to support critical policing and prison services, and provision of limited systems development and equipment. Activities in Output 2 will also work with the Judicial Police Authority, under the Ministry of Justice, subject to the needed organisational assessment and planning processes conducted under Output 1, to support implementation of targeted reforms, including through training for prison staff, improvements to case management systems, and the establishment of effective vetting and oversight in human resources. Output 2 activities may also provide direct material and technical assistance for coordinating police, prison, and civilian emergency response actors with the Joint Operations Centre (JOC) envisaged by the Tripoli Security Plan. A strategic communications campaign will also support MOI/MOJ engagement with beneficiary communities, and shape and inform public confidence in and awareness of state services, awareness of the rights of detainees, and complaints systems for public and for prisoners.

Output 3: Ministry of Interior enabled to better assess and provide feasible reintegration and demobilisation options for members of armed formations

Output 3 complements the gradual scale-up of policing and prison services of Output 2, by assist the GNA with initial steps towards demobilisation and reintegration of armed formations into host communities. This will include support to the Committee on Reintegration, under the auspices of the Ministry of Interior, to update mapping and analysis, and to evaluate options and comparative models for reintegration processes. The programme will support a preliminary survey conducted by MOI counterparts on alternative livelihood options/expectations, with a view to gaging appetite and incentives for reintegration of members of armed formations. Subject to the results of this activity it will also support government provision of onward options to individuals who respond positively to MOI engagement programmes. Output 3 activities are deliberately envisaged to be limited in scope with a view to shaping and informing national debate and viewpoints on the issue of reintegrating armed groups into civilian life, and to contribute to the formation of a broader strategy on demobilisation.

Output 4: Ministry of Interior provided with capacity development and organisational assistance

Output 4 underpins Outputs 1-3 by providing capacity building support to the Ministry of Interior, focusing again on those capacities particularly important to providing tangible improvement to policing services to the public. By supporting and enhancing existing organisational reforms efforts, and authorised structures, within the Ministry of Interior, Output 4 aims to provide the MOI with essential and strategically-focused executive directional assistance, strategic planning capacity, reform and improvement of budgetary and financial management, and reform and improvement of human resources, procurement and logistics functions. It will develop oversight and accountability mechanisms within the MOI and MOJ in a way complementary to the project's own ongoing M&E mechanisms. In specifically focusing on those reforms that support the broader objectives of enhancing security and the rule of law services, Output 4 will work where possible through and with key entities, which may include the Training Authority, General Administration for Administrative Affairs, and Office of the Minister and his deputies.

Theory of change

A theory of change underpinning the programme is elaborated around the preconditions and change pathways outlined in the text box below.

PRECONDITIONS & OUTPUTS

- **If** the MOI can assess, clarify, and update the structure, roles and resourcing of police directorates and services, take on board better community-led policing practices and if similar work can be done to improve coordination with the MOJ, prison management services, and related institutions, **and**;
- **If** the MOI and MOJ can be provided sufficient capacity development and organisational assistance to do so – in the form of better strategic planning, project management and delivery, human resources and vetting, and better administrative processes;
- **Then** UN joint programme partners can better support the MOI and MOJ in improving the effectiveness of police and prison service delivery in Tripoli, and militate better against risks involved in training and technical and material assistance, **and**;
- **Then** improved state security services, executive and administrative capacity and the ability to provide stronger law enforcement and justice services reduce the incentives for ongoing mobilisation of armed groups within the communities. This increases opportunities for credible, long-term options for reintegrating and demobilising its armed formations into society.

STRATEGIC OUTCOME

- Libyan government efforts, supported by the UN, to stabilise Tripoli are more likely to succeed; police operations and services can achieve a baseline level of activity, visibility, respect and effectiveness; forces are reintegrated into host communities; public confidence improved in the ability of the State to provide security and justice services and in the effectiveness of the police and criminal justice institutions.

Based on this theory of change, the response strategy of the UNSMIL/UNDP Joint Programme prioritises efforts to ensure a safer and more secure environment in Tripoli, alongside the implementation of targeted organisational reforms designed to prevent further weakening of institutional capacities and to nurture central capabilities to sustain gains in security and the rule of law. An improved security context in Tripoli, including through efforts to initiate reintegration of armed formations, can enhance confidence in the PC/GNA and provide an enabling environment for addressing broader social and economic development.

Table 1: Results Framework

UN Strategic Framework:	Area 3 (Public Administration and Governance); Area 4 (Human Rights, Transitional Justice and Rule of Law.				
UNDP CPD outcome(s):	Outcome 3: Libya successfully manages a transition to a state founded on the rule of law.				
Sustainable Development Goal:	SDG 16: Peace, justice and strong institutions.				
Applicable Key Result Area (from 2014-2017 UNDP Strategic Plan):	UNDP Strategic Plan Output 3.4: Functions, financing and capacity of rule of law institutions enabled, including to improve access to justice and redress. UNDP Strategic Plan Output 3.5: Communities empowered and security sector institutions enabled for increased citizen safety and reduced levels of armed violence.				
Partnership strategy:	The project will be implemented in partnership with the Ministry of Interior and the Libyan Police, as well as the MOJ and judicial police, as a UNDP-UNSMIL joint programme through the UNDP Direct Implementation (DIM) project modality. Memoranda of Understanding shall be signed with key Libyan stakeholders, specifically the MOI and MOJ.				
Project title:	UNSMIL/UNDP Policing & Security Joint Programme (1 October 2017 – 30 September 2019).				
ATLAS Award ID:	Award: 00066608 Project: 00107061				
JOINT PROGRAMME OUTCOME:	National capacities to advance safety and security in Tripoli are improved, including through more effective and public-oriented policing and rule of law services.				
Indicator(s):					
<i>Outcome indicator 1:</i>	Proportion of victims of violence in the previous 12 months who reported their victimisation to competent authorities or other officially recognised conflict resolution mechanisms (SDG indicator 16.3.1)				
<i>Outcome indicator 2:</i>	The population's perception of the ability of the police to control crime in the community (UN ROL indicator 1)				
Baseline(s):					
<i>Baseline 1:</i>	Baseline expected for June 2018				
<i>Baseline 2:</i>	Baseline expected for June 2018				
Joint programme outputs	Indicative activities	Responsible parties	Resource allocation (USD) and indicative time frame*		
Output 1: Structure, roles and resourcing of local police and criminal justice institutions clarified and prioritised according to identified needs in Tripoli.	1.1. Clarify and codify the organisational structure, staffing numbers and duties, and governance/accountability mechanisms among police HQ, branches, stations and specialised services, and between police and prison facilities.	UNDP/ UNSMIL	Y1	Y2	Total
			48,337.47	167,737.97	
	1.2. Develop appropriate training curriculae for police and judicial police, and ensure that training curriculae support long-term harmonisation of capacities between pre- and post-2011 intakes.	UNDP/ UNSMIL	144,272.47	84,331.97	228,604.43
Indicator(s):					

<p>Indicator 1: Criminal justice and law enforcement institutions in Tripoli have clear and updated organisational structures in place.</p> <p>Indicator 2: De facto cooperation exists between judicial police and MOI/police to address security needs in Tripoli.</p> <p><u>Baseline(s):</u></p> <p>Baseline 1: No</p> <p>Baseline 2: No</p>	<p>1.3. Review and develop relevant SOPs (consistent with broader government reform efforts) such as on coordination between police and judicial police, communications flow, police operations and community policing, pre-trial detainee and prisoner tracking and case management, and prison management.</p> <p>1.4. Conduct crime and victimisation trends survey for Tripoli with technical advice to police and prisons management on survey design, analysis and planning, to help inform policing and criminal justice priorities and responses in Tripoli.</p> <p>1.5. Assess prison facility security and security requirements for judges and prosecutors in locations in Tripoli.</p> <p>1.6. Assess acceptance and implementation of Law No. 5 and related legal instruments governing Libya's prisons, and develop a clear conception of the purpose of imprisonment and an articulation of prisoners' rights.</p> <p>1.7. For police and judicial police, assess (a) training needs (drawing where necessary on previous needs assessments); and (b) equipment and systems needs.</p>	<p>Indicator 2: The quality and accuracy of police records of individuals held in custody. (UN ROL indicator 37)</p> <p><u>Baseline(s):</u></p> <p>Baseline 1: Baseline expected June 2018</p> <p>Baseline 2: Baseline expected June 2018</p>	<p>1.3. UNDP/ UNSMIL</p> <p>46,705.47</p> <p>188,665.97</p> <p>235,371.43</p>
<p>Output 2: Effectiveness of law enforcement and prison service delivery in Tripoli improved through provision of training and technical and material assistance.</p> <p><u>Indicator(s):</u></p> <p>Indicator 1: The extent to which prison staff receive adequate human rights training. (UN ROL indicator 126)</p> <p>Indicator 2: The quality and accuracy of police records of individuals held in custody. (UN ROL indicator 37)</p> <p><u>Baseline(s):</u></p> <p>Baseline 1: Baseline expected June 2018</p> <p>Baseline 2: Baseline expected June 2018</p>	<p>2.1. Establish vetting/selection and human resourcing plans and oversight procedures for police & prison personnel in Tripoli consistent with Libyan training and staffing needs as well as donor and UN human rights due diligence requirements.</p> <p>2.2. Support the development of a holistic community-based policing model for Tripoli including through engagement with civil society and rule of law service providers (e.g. via justice & security working groups), and providing relevant technical and material assistance for its roll-out.</p> <p>2.3. Conduct (and as appropriate build capacity for) training for vetted police and prison officers in Tripoli, to support critical policing/prison services, to include minimum standards for treatment of prisoners and detainees.</p> <p>2.4. Provide systems development and limited equipment for critical policing and rule of law services (including work on strengthening case management systems and improving linkages between police, public prosecution, MOI/MOJ investigative facilities, judicial police, and enforcement of judgments.)</p> <p>2.5. Conduct strategic communications campaign in Tripoli aimed at improving public awareness of criminal justice and policing services, codes of conduct, crime reporting and police complaints procedures.</p>	<p>Indicator 3: Ministry of Interior enabled to better assess and provide feasible reintegration and</p>	<p>2.1. UNDP/ UNSMIL</p> <p>107,342.05</p> <p>83,064.75</p> <p>190,406.80</p> <p>2.2. UNDP/ UNSMIL</p> <p>158,899.05</p> <p>198,064.75</p> <p>356,963.80</p> <p>2.3. UNDP/ UNSMIL</p> <p>312,082.05</p> <p>398,064.75</p> <p>710,146.80</p> <p>2.4. UNDP/ UNSMIL</p> <p>126,882.05</p> <p>482,864.75</p> <p>609,746.80</p> <p>2.5. UNDP/ UNSMIL</p> <p>212,082.05</p> <p>238,064.75</p> <p>450,146.80</p>
<p>Output 3: Ministry of Interior enabled to better assess and provide feasible reintegration and</p>	<p>3.1. In support of MOI efforts to review and update assessments of armed formations under the purview of the police, support the Committee on Reintegration with capacity-building on statistical data collection</p>		<p>UNDP/ UNSMIL</p> <p>107,428.31</p> <p>131,497.44</p> <p>238,925.75</p>

demobilisation options for members of armed formations		<i>and management, including in the area of personnel records.</i>					
Indicator(s):							
Indicator 1: No. of MOI personnel working on DDR trained on statistical data collection, management and analysis.		3.2.	Support the Minister and DM office with statistical data analysis training and information-based planning with a view to advancing DDR processes in Libya.	UNDP/ UNSMIL	70,810.81	108,114.94	178,925.75
Indicator 2: Number of post-2011 entrants to the MOI provided with DDR support by the MOI.		3.3.	Provide DDR solutions for circa 100 (pre-identified) post-2011 entrants to the MOI.	UNDP/ UNSMIL	121,030.81	131,497.44	252,528.25
Baseline(s):		3.4.	Support MOI with analysis on, and implementation of arrangements for, alternative (non-public sector) employment opportunities, and psychosocial support options , for members of armed formations participating in MOI demobilisation efforts.	UNDP/ UNSMIL	126,320.81	471,497.44	597,818.25
Baseline 1: Unknown Baseline 2: Unknown							
Output 4: Ministry of Interior provided with capacity development and organisational assistance		4.1.	Support the Office of the Minister of Interior and deputy ministerial offices with capacity building on strategic planning, organisational reform, and project management and delivery.	UNDP/ UNSMIL	103,259.05	114,700.75	217,959.80
Indicator(s):		4.2.	Conduct training on strategic planning, project management, communications and leadership development with the Ministry of Interior and National Security Directorate.	UNDP/ UNSMIL	192,082.05	238,064.75	430,146.80
Indicator 1: MOI has in place effective administrative systems to support key management functions such as the management of finances, assets, human resources and procurement. (UN ROL indicator 39)		4.3.	Support MOI reforms and capacity-building in the areas of budget, procurement and facilities management.	UNDP/ UNSMIL	103,259.05	114,700.75	217,959.80
Baseline(s):		4.4.	Support MOI reforms in the areas of human resources management and systems , including payroll management, conditions of service, etc.	UNDP/ UNSMIL	126,882.05	232,864.75	359,746.80
Baseline 1: Baseline expected June 2018		4.5.	Support MOI implementation of civilian oversight and accountability mechanisms, systems and procedures (e.g. governance, audit, codes of conduct, etcetera.)	UNDP/ UNSMIL	96,312.05	52,864.75	149,176.80
Total		Programme Cost**			2,759,937.52	3,573,990.54	6,333,928.06
		Indirect Support Cost**			220,795.00	285,919.24	506,714.24
Grand total		Direct and indirect costs			2,980,732.52	3,859,909.78	6,840,642.30

*Resource allocation may be agreed at either output or indicative activity level.

** Please read the [Explanatory Note on Harmonised Financial Reporting to Donors](#) and its Annexes for guidance on how these terms should be interpreted


5. Governance, management and coordination arrangements

Building on lessons learned as well as standard global best practices for joint programming, the UNSMIL/UNDP Joint Programme integrates a number of mechanisms to ensure effective governance, programme management and coordination, both internally and externally vis-à-vis national stakeholders, donors/development partners and other implementers. The structures set out in this joint programme document do not substitute for organisation-specific arrangements required by respective internal policies of UNSMIL and UNDP. Fund management arrangements are detailed separately under section six (6) of this programme document.

Programme governance

A Joint Programme Board will be established in accordance with a 'terms of reference' to be attached to this programme document. The Programme Board, which will be co-chaired by the UNDP Libya Country Director, the UNSMIL Senior Military Advisor, and the Libyan Minister of Interior, represents the main governance entity of the joint programme, responsible for guiding the overall strategic direction of the programme and reviewing implementation progress and results. The Programme Board will be convened annually, and will include the programme's main national stakeholders, the participating UN entities, and key donors/development partners. The Joint Programme team will meet at least monthly. The programme governance structure is illustrated in the diagram below.

Figure 1: Joint programme governance structure



Programme management

Under the supervision of the UNDP Programme Coordinator, and in close liaison with Head of UNSMIL Security Institutions Division, the Joint Programme Manager will be tasked with overall management of UNSMIL/UNDP Joint Programme, ensuring that the Joint Programme produces the expected results set out in the programme document and subsequent annual work plans. In addition, s/he will be responsible for issuing (joint) narrative and financial reports to account for resources allocated and results achieved. The Joint Programme Manager will direct the joint programme team in all programme-related activities under their purview. The joint programme team shall be comprised as follows:

UNDP

Joint Programme Manager (P4)
Monitoring & Evaluation Specialist 12.5% (P3)
Project Officer (SB4/C-IMS)
Project Assistant (SB3/1 - Tunis)
Security Sector Advisor (IC/Int'l)
National Project Coordinator 50% (D-IMS)
Translator/Interpreter (B-IMS)

UNSMIL

Police Advisor(s) (UNSMIL)
Corrections Advisor (UNSMIL)

Internal management and coordination

At the level of UN coordination and oversight, UNSMIL and UNDP senior managements shall appoint focal points to meet monthly with the Joint Programme Manager as a **UN programme coordination committee**, designed to strengthen effective interagency cooperation and programme implementation. In addition, programmatic and technical capacities of UNSMIL and UNDP, working on the Joint Programme shall be co-located to ensure harmonious policy direction and alignment. Memoranda of Understanding may be signed with key programme partners (MOI and MOJ). The Joint Programme will make all efforts to coordinate with other projects and programmes of the UNCT in relevant areas.

External coordination

The UNSMIL/UNDP Joint Programme will ensure close coordination with the various international assistance providers (bilateral and multilateral) working in the areas of rule of law and security institutions assistance. In particular, the European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) will be a critical partner for technical and strategic cooperation in the course of programme implementation. Annual work plans will be extensively consulted with all relevant actors, in particular via the Joint **Steering Committee** on Rule of Law and Security Institutions Assistance, comprised of UNSMIL, UNDP, EUBAM and EULPC, and its **Joint Technical Working Group**.

Donor coordination

The formal legal relationship between bilateral donors and the participating UN entities of the joint programme is regulated by the 'Third-party Cost-sharing Agreement' between the donor and UNDP. Without prejudice to the provisions stipulated in the respective Standard Administrative Arrangements, a 'Donor Consortium' will be established to facilitate collective engagement between the joint programme and its donors/development partners. The UNSMIL/UNDP Joint Programme, via the Joint Programme Manager, will convene quarterly formal meetings of the Donor Consortium to ensure maximal engagement. The functions and parameters of the consortium will be agreed by consensus and set out in an annex to this programme document, entitled 'ancillary matters pertaining to donor coordination'.

6. Fund management arrangements

Fund management: UNDP Libya shall act as the managing agent, retaining full accountability for donor funding allocated to the programme in accordance with the established Programme and Operational Policies and Procedures.

Budget preparation: The Joint Programme Manager will prepare a complete programme budget for submission to donors and the Programme Board.

Accounting: UNDP will account for the income received to fund programme components in accordance with its financial regulations and rules.

Indirect costs: UNDP will recover indirect costs in accordance with its financial regulations.

Interest on funds: Interest will be administered in accordance with UNDP’s financial regulations and rules and as documented in the contribution instrument signed with the donor(s).

Balance of funds: The disposition of any balance of funds remaining at the end of programme implementation will be in accordance with the agreements between UNDP and the donor(s).

Audit: UNDP will be audited in accordance with its Financial Regulations and Rules.

Transfer of cash to national implementing partners: Cash transfer modalities, the size and frequency of disbursements, and the scope and frequency of monitoring, reporting, assurance and audit will be agreed prior to programme implementation, taking into consideration the capacity of implementing partners, and can be adjusted in its course in accordance with applicable UNDP policies, processes and procedures.

7. Monitoring, evaluation and reporting

Monitoring: A joint M&E strategy and plan will be developed at the start of the programme that will guide the monitoring and evaluation work of the UNSMIL/UNDP joint programme.

The below table lists the output, outcome and impact level indicators the UNSMIL/UNDP joint programme will measure progress against during programme implementation. Drawing on best practices and lessons learnt from UNDP’s extensive programming experience globally, these indicators will be carefully selected for their ability to track key strategic changes envisaged by the programme. A combination of qualitative and quantitative indicators, they will provide evidence against the Theory of Change that underscores the programme. At the outcome and impact level, indicators will be fully aligned with UN Strategic Framework and UNDP Country Programme Document. In addition to this ‘core set’ of joint programme indicators, the implementing UN entities will develop activity or project level performance indicators as part of more regular monitoring against the annual work plan throughout the year.

Table 2: Joint programme monitoring framework (JPMF)

The participating UN entities will develop, within one month of programme initiation, a joint programme monitoring framework consistent with the template below and the indicators proposed in the results framework above.

Expected results (Outcomes & outputs)	Indicators (with baselines & indicative timeframe)	Means of verification	Collection methods (with indicative time frame & frequency)	Responsibilities	Risks & assumptions

Annual/regular reviews: The UNSMIL/UNDP joint programme will implement a system of ongoing review of progress, at two distinct but inter-related levels:

- Ongoing monitoring against the theory of change and the results framework indicators as listed above. This will be done at an annual basis, and will form the basis for reporting to donors and

other stakeholders. This review process will include review of the risks and assumptions that underscore the programme’s theory of change, and will be revised as appropriate. With the support of the programme team, the joint programme manager will be responsible for this process, including coordinating data collection and tracking of progress against these targets, with support from the joint programme staff of the participating UN entities.

- Monitoring of progress on implementing the annual work plan. This is a more detailed tracking of progress at the activity level, and responsibility rests with the individual agency who will draw on their corporate M&E systems as they deem relevant. However, the Joint Secretariat M&E team will set up mid-year and annual reviews, to ensure continued cross-agency coordination and coherence between the different inter-related implementation frameworks.

The UNSMIL/UNDP joint programme will align its annual reviews with the reviews scheduled under the UN Strategic Framework implementation mechanism, given the fact that it has aligned – to the degree possible – its results framework indicators with those of the UN Strategic Framework.

Evaluation:

- One year into programme implementation a light, mid-term independent evaluation will be conducted of the UNSMIL/UNDP joint programme that will take stock of progress against planned results and provide recommendations for implementation and any necessary readjustment of strategic direction for the final year of programme implementation. Recommendations of this evaluation will inform planning for subsequent phases of programming, and progress on implementation of its recommendation will be reported back to all stakeholders, including donors/development partners.
- A final impact evaluation will be conducted no later than 2 months before completion of the programme.

Risk management: In view of the fragility of the Libyan context, the Joint Programme will put in place robust risk management and mitigation measures, including through full vetting of programme beneficiaries, application of the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy, development of rolling risk matrix to help guide responsive programme implementation, and third-party verification of programme dividends at the level of the end user.

Reporting: Reporting on programme implementation will follow the guidelines as set forth by the UNDP Programme and Operations Policies and Procedures (POPP), and as stipulated in the relevant instruments signed between programme donors and UNDP Libya.

A joint programme annual report will be prepared that will present analysis of progress against results and indicator targets, and analysis of lessons learned, challenges and risks. Prepared by the joint programme manager with inputs from the joint programme staff of the participating UN entities, it will reflect progress and achievements of the implementing entities in an integrated manner. In addition, the programme will produce regular updates on progress for dissemination to stakeholders, and/or as required by donors.

8. Legal context or basis of relationship

Table 3: Basis of relationship

Participating UN entity	Agreement
UNDP	This Joint Programme Document shall be the instrument referred to as the Project Document in Article I of the Standard Basic Assistance Agreement between the Government of Libya and the United Nations Development Programme, signed by the parties on 20 May, 1976.

UNSMIL	On the basis of Security Council Resolution 2009, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) was established on 16 September, 2011. Its mandate was most recently extended on 14 September 2017 (S/RES/2376).
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The Implementing Partners/Executing Agency⁵ agree to undertake all reasonable efforts to ensure that none of the funds received pursuant to this Joint Programme are used to provide support to individuals or entities associated with terrorism and that the recipients of any amounts provided by Participating UN organisations do not appear on the list maintained by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999). The list can be accessed via <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267ListEng.htm>. This provision must be included in all sub-contracts or sub-agreements entered into under this programme document.

9. Work plans and budgets

Detailed, budgeted annual work plans (AWPs) will be developed by the joint programme on a calendar year basis, consistent with the format presented in Annex III. Annual work plans will detail the activities to be carried out within the joint programme and by the responsible implementing partners, timeframes and planned inputs from the participating UN organisations. Work plans will be presented annually at the meeting of the Programme Board and approved by signature of the co-chairs of the Programme Board. Donors/development partners shall be consulted on and approve the AWP separately in a donor consortium meeting proceeding the meeting of the Programme Board.

The 2017 AWP will be annexed to the current programme document.

⁵ Executing Agency in case of UNDP in countries with no signed Country Programme Action Plans

Annual work plan for UNSMIL/UNDP Policing & Security Joint Programme

Period (covered by the AWP)⁶: 1 October 2017 – 31 December 2017

JP Outcome										
UN entity-specific Annual targets	UN entity	Activities	TIME FRAME				Implementing partner	PLANNED BUDGET		
			Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4		Source of funds	Budget description	Amount
JP Output 1:										
(of UN organisation 1)										
(of UN organisation 2)										
(of UN organisation 3)										
JP Output 2:										
(of UN organisation 1)										
(of UN organisation 2)										
Total Planned Budget										

Signatures⁷:

Executing UN entity	National coordinating authority
Ms. Noura Hamladji UNDP Libya Country Director	H.E. Mr. Al-Aref al-Khoga Minister of the Interior
United Nations Development Programme [Date]	Government of Libya [Date]

⁶ Annual Work plans cover not more than a 12-month period. However, usually at the start-up of the programme, these may cover less than one year. In both cases, the corresponding period should be specified.

⁷ When CSOs/NGOs are designated Implementing Partners, they do not sign this Work Plan. Each participating UN Organisation will follow its own procedures in signing Work Plans with CSOs/NGOs.